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Populism and Privatization
Damir Ostovic
Economic policy, particularly when implemented in
a country which is changing its entire economic system, is
ne,:,er pure techn.o.logy. It is a combination of knowledge
~science) and political will, a compromise between varying
interests and the results of power relations, which can
nevertheless succeed only on the wings of strong public
support.
. ~f a.ll o~ the segments of economic policy,
pnvanzation IS the most subject to the influence of
populism. Decision-makers often decide according to the
criteria of the virtual reality of the media. They need to
estimate how a given move will be received by the public,
whether or not it will threaten acquired rights and impose
a distributive inequity, so that the complete picture seems
fragmented and indecisive, without even a framework of
clearly recognizable strategy.
. T~e definition of populism used in this text is activity
which IS completely subordinated to plebiscitary public
su~port. Populism is a negation of technocratic activity
which moves within the limits of the imperatives of the
optimum feasibility of a given action. In practice, populism
consists of a combination of powerful rhetoric (concern
for. the pu?lic ~ood), actual non-action (tactical waiting
which avoids mistakes and hasty actions) and unrealistic
goals (which are not meant to be achieved anyway), as
well as a large part of every public decision which is
motivated by electoral votes. In a certain sense, every
modern politician is by definition a populist, and all
decision-makers who manage people show a certain dose
of populism, even in the world of business. Here it can
even be said that many management techniques include
populist impulses. However, such a definition is too wide
and populism will herein be considered as only that activity
which is inspired by public support that contradicts
technical optimum feasibility. Populist activity utilizes the
propagandistically understood dimension of the future (its
subject is promises, not results), but at the same time
requires the absolute domination of the present and short
historical memory, so that it can hide the fact of unfulfilled
promises. This is a noisy projection of the future in a
permanent present.
The relation between populism and popularity (the
successfully attained popular support for some goal and
activity to attain this goal) is by no means single-faceted
and even less proportional. Populist activity may more
frequently provoke public dissatisfaction. From the
standpoint of a final motive or causality (appraisal of some
action not according to its components, good intentions
or its course, but exclusively according to the outcome),
populism is very unpopular, as it necessarily results in
disappointment of that same public with which it tries to
curry favor. That is why we say that it is short-lived, that it
does not even achieve its own goals, and that in the end it
always turns into its own nemesis. Populism is the fastest
and shortest way to a final failure.
The question of consensus
It is often said that privatization is that segment of
economic policy which requires public support. In a more
intense form, this standpoint declares that a broad national
c~n~ensus on p:ivatization is necessary. As it is very
difficult to attain general agreement on any issue of
interest, it leads to the question of the strictness of this
demand. Namely, is the "consensus" a metaphor for the
critical mass of social mobilization for some problem? In
the case of privatization such a weakened form of
consensus would be made up of people in the process in
sufficiently massive voluntary participation, as well as a
favorable stance toward the enrichment of some fellow
citizens and toward foreign investments.
Mobilization is not just a matter of a propaganda
campaign, for it is necessary to establish values which will
be suitable to the majority. This can be seen quite well in
the strategy and program of Croatian privatization, which
was conceived in 1991 and subsequently amended by
technical mechanisms which were meant to be the
legislature's response to new circumstances.
In determining the strategy of privatization, from day
one Cr~atia had to satisfy three, not always mutually
compatible, goals: the economic, the political and the
social. The economic goal was to increase the overall
efficiency of the country's economy, and to achieve this
we h~d to enlarge the role of private entrepreneurship,
that IS, speed up the process of privatization along with
the involvement of foreign capital, since domestic financial
and technological resources were insufficient for successful
restructuring. The political goal was twofold: on the one
hand, to create an image of a country open to foreign
investment on one of the most favorable business locations
in the new Europe, and, on the other, to avoid giving
grounds for domestic criticism of bargain sales of
enterprises and to compensate the citizens for the
consequences of an unnatural regime imposed on them
for decades. The latter goal, a manifestation of a historic
and political justice of sorts, justice for certain categories
of the population in particular, substantially overlaps with
the social goal, which was intended to produce mass
participation in the privatization process. The underlying
principle was that the national wealth had been created
through the efforts of generations of Croatian citizens,
which ought to be proportionately represented in
privatization.
These abstract and principled goals probably do not
differ much from the goals set by other countries in
transition. However, Croatia was in a very specific
situation which had a profound impact on the basic
philosophy of privatization:
1. Self-management socialism and the corresponding
concept of social ownership.
2. War and the ensuing burden on the state budget.
3. Large numbers of displaced people, war disabled
people, war widows and other people who had lost all of
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their private property due to war, and who all needed to
be approached in a special manner.
4. Large public debt on the basis of frozen foreign
exchange deposits (FFED)
The first factor, the tradition of the economic and
political system in power prior to democratic changes, gave
rise to an important feature of the Croatian model of
privatization: the autonomy of transformation. In other
words, during the reign of self-management socialism,
enterprises were relatively independent from the central
government and did not produce according to centralized
planning, while the employees were being told that they
actually owned the enterprises they worked in.
The result of several decades of such a political system
was a widespread belief that no one could take away from
the employees what was theirs, that it made no sense to
buyout something they owned, and that in any kind of
further redistribution of capital they could only lose.
Exactly because of this it was only logical to let the
enterprises autonomously propose the manner of their
privatization, to carry out the evaluation of their assets
and total value, and to authorize the state institution in
charge of privatization only for the approval or rejection
of the submitted transformation programs, thus preventing
it from forcing any privatization model (no matter how
economically or technologically superior it may be) on any
enterprise.
The autonomy of transformation favored the
incumbent managements, who became the sole
interpreters of transformation and used it according to
their own interests. Hence the pronounced tendency, in
Croatia, toward the development of managerial capitalism
in which the executive community has a disproportionately
stronger role than the owners of capital, except in cases
where the owner takes over a controlling interest and,
consequently, all executive authority. Another legacy of
self-management socialism was the advantage granted to
employees, former employees and retired employees who
had priority in subscribing to the shares of their
enterprises, under the same financial terms of payment,
however, as the rest of the population, with a discount
calculated on the basis of years of employment.
Ifwe can say that self-management socialism caused
the autonomy of transformation, then we can also say that
social ownership determined the process of transformation
of ownership as the first stage of privatization. The
argument went as follows: If the main goal of privatization
as the cornerstone of an overall transition of our society is
to increase economic efficiency, then privatization cannot
be carried out without a prior transformation of ownership
from social capital, as a form of non-ownership, into
private ownership. For this reason we had to eliminate
the indeterminate category of social capital at any cost,
since it provided no foundation for further development.
The first stage of privatization coincided with a period
of enormous public spending on defence and displaced
and refugee populations, which precluded mass
privatization through a free distribution of vouchers, that
is, the would-be shareholders had to buy their shares. In
this, the workers' past contributions to the enterprises were
compensated for by the granted priority in subscription
to shares and by substantial discounts, while the process
also took into account the legitimate interests of the
owners of nationalized property. Owing to war
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circumstances, privatization was also understood at the
time as a major source of income for the budget.
Nonetheless, the other important argument for the sale
rather than free distribution of equity was of a conceptual
nature: responsible management can be expected only
from someone who has paid for shares and, therefore, has
a vested interest in the good performance of the company.
The practice of free distribution of vouchers to the
population implemented in some countries was emulated
in Croatia by substantial discounts on the par value of
shares (from 20 to 60 per cent, depending on years of
employment), which discount was available to the
shareholder immediately after the payment of the first
yearly instalment of 5% of the total payable portion of
the contract, regardless of possible later cessation of
payments, as determined in amendments to the Law
passed in early 1994.
The third determinant was the uneven burden of war,
which made a linear distribution of shares to the general
population an unfair solution. Thus, disabled war veterans
and widows of fallen soldiers remain the only categories
who have been awarded free shares of par value ranging
from DM 5,000 to 20,000, and a similar scheme is being
planned for the displaced population and those whose
entire property has been destroyed in the war.
The fourth factor determining the privatization
model was the large public debt, that is, the foreign
exchange deposits of citizens which were drained from
Croatia's banking system prior to the war to the amount
of DM 4.6 billion. In an attempt to save the banks and
restore public confidence in the banking system, the newly-
founded state of Croatia converted these deposits into
public debt and offered the holders a possibility to collect,
at first, the interest on their deposits and, after June 1995,
to withdraw the principal amount. The banks were obliged
to payout foreign exchange to certain categories of holders
(displaced persons, the seriously ill, the socially
disadvantaged, pensioners, etc.) from their own resources,
and later charge the amount against the state budget. Since
the government did not really have the necessary funds, it
came up with a strategy aimed at reducing the public debt
according to which the certificates of frozen foreign
exchange deposits (FFED certificates) could be used as a
means of payment in the purchase of equity and socially-
owned fiats. Thus, small shareholders have been able to
pay their instalments with FFED (their own or bought at
the secondary market), while the practice has been
somewhat more restrictive toward foreign strategic
investors, who can pay in FFED only if the company in
question has failed to find a buyer for cash. The weekly
trading of shares for FFED started in April 1994 at the
Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE).
The following question arises immediately: on which
of these elements is it possible to achieve a consensus?
Or: would it be easier to achieve social mobilization for
such a strategy, or within its defined goals, than it would
be with another strategy with differently formulated goals?
The other question is: who is the authorized interpreter
of the consensus?
Political will likes to legitimize goals by showing that
a consensus exists on some idea, and that it actually
represents the common public interest. In this it is
disputable whether the common public interest has ever
in history been attained through a consensus.
JANUARY - MARCH 1996
Croatian privatization began with transformation, an
expensive and complex procedure for the abolishment of
social ownership as a form of non-ownership and the
identification of new owners in the spirit of the market
economy. To commence privatization through
transformation is not an idea on which a consensus could
be obtained, even among a much narrower public
consisting of experts. Some experts proposed either a one-
time nationalization (a less expensive solution, after which
either commercial privatization or some form of
distribution would commence) or leaving the companies
to their employees (i.e., the ownership consequence of
self-management). Thus, the reasons for this solution were
not to gain public support or to cater to populist impulses.
Rather, they had a more technical-political nature: to take
stock of all existing resources in unstable times, in the midst
of a war, as well as to slow the possible uncontrolled
transfer of ownership into unwanted hands. The
justifiability of this expense is still being debated today.
My personal opinion is that it would be difficult to find
another reason which could compel such a mass of
companies to make their history, inventory of property,
operations and development plans open to the inspection
of a public institution. Despite the imprecisions and strictly
formal satisfaction of some inquiries, the entire action
resulted in an archive of historical significance, which
would not exist in a less expensive single act of registration.
However, other elements of the transformation
procedure were certainly designed to obtain public
support, or they promised the maintenance of acquired
rights in a new form. This primarily refers to the tactful
relationship with the most powerful participants in the
process: former and current managements, former
workers/"self-managing employees" who became small
shareholders, as well as those underprivileged groups who
have borne the burden of the war more than others.
The use of frozen foreign currency deposits as a
payment instrument is identical to the use of bonds on
the basis of external and internal debt in other countries
and was at the time more an issue for which public support
was still to be attained than one which would have supplied
the same for the privatization program. However, the
previous creation of the category of "frozen foreign
currency deposits" could be exposed as a public decision
with strong populist overtones should the government
abandon its obligation to pay after the expiration of the
period which it established itself only several years before.
Not a single one of the strategic courses of Croatian
privatization is a result of consensus, and the question is
whether any type of coherent concept could have been
attained by consensus. It can be said that a consensus
existed only on the question of basic values, i.e., on the
need for privatization to be carried out. In contrast to some
other countries in which there are still proponents of a
state form of ownership, in Croatia there were no serious
political forces or individuals who supported the
preservation of non-private ownership.
This section showed that the question of consensus
is a pseudo-question of mere rhetorical power, as a subject
of a propaganda campaign which tells people that it will
impose upon them that which they have actually always
wanted. Consensus can be obtained for basic values, but
not for individual implementation techniques or segments
of some complex program. Instead of unproductive poll-
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type investigations asking "what would the largest number
of people like to see", public support should be sought in
another way: through a rationally and technically mature
installation of a model which will be realized in a
confirmed period and will guarantee a good portion of
support through its success. The rest is just the stuff of
propaganda anyway.
The popularity of good implementation
In addition to the ownership transformation which
is still in progress, Croatia also had to face the much more
urgent task of monetary stabilization. In view of the long-
lasting hyper-inflation, the initial situation looked much
more unfavorable than did the prospects for the speedy
and elegant implementation of privatization.
The stabilization of the monetary system is not
directly involved in the distribution of the national wealth
in the same way that privatization is, so it looks much more
like a purely technical issue. This means that its designers
were in a somewhat better position than those involved in
privatization, as they were less subject to populist pressure.
However, populism in the monetary sphere is not at all
unimaginable. On the contrary! It was in precisely this
segment that communist economies behaved in a
particularly populist manner, and many Third World
countries are not far behind in this.
When Croatia began its monetary stabilization, many
foresaw a short future for this program. It was known that
a restrictive supply of money would provoke non-liquidity,
and that this could become reflected in the purchasing
power. From the start, the program was not very popular.
However, the government could have chosen another way
- it could have promised the monetization of losses, raised
salaries to the level attained during Markovic's term of
office, and utilize an entire series of populist techniques
which by now would certainly have crashed a hundred
times. Instead, the government chose the method of a
technical optimum and in the end gained great popularity
based on the results of this program. Polls show a
significant partiality to these results, although few people
could say what has changed for the better in their
individual lives or whether their purchasing power has
risen at all. But instead of this they saw that one promise
was fulfilled, that uncertainty was defeated, and control
was established over events which are no longer as
inevitable as natural disasters. At the same time, they were
given the gift of belief in the value of domestic currency
for the first time.
Had the program catered to the "people in the street"
and promised them a dramatic increase in purchasing
power, had it catered to companies and guaranteed them
compensation of losses, it probably would have been
popular for a few months, but it would not have succeeded
or maintained popularity for a few weeks longer.
Populism is the best guarantee of unpopularity in the long
run.
Why this is an important issue?
The introductory thesis holds that of all the segments
of the economic policy of a country, privatization is
perhaps the most subject to the influence of populism.
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The issues such as distributional justice, the sensitive issue
of foreign investment and the "sale of the family silver",
the problem of objective value and fair prices, advocacy
of the market while fearing its consequences, particularly
in terms of redundancies and social stratification in which
privatization stands out as an extremely anti-egalitarian
process (thus a possible reason for the loss of votes in
elections, and this after both successful and unsuccessful
privatization efforts), have so much influence on decision-
makers that they often consciously make technically
incorrect moves, simply to ward off public criticism or to
gradually prepare the public for the acceptance of rational
decisions. Here the function of time is very important:
namely, from the technical standpoint it is desirable to go
at maximum speed, by which a new state of affairs is
established, i.e., the basis for a new order which has good
prospects for further development; however, from the
standpoint of public reception, time is a function of a
collective cognitive process, which requires duration.
This can be compared to the bankruptcy procedure.
The practice of developed market economies is to carry
out bankruptcy in as short time as possible. Figuratively
speaking, on Friday, so that by Monday the factory would
continue working, relieved of all debts, with a new owner,
etc. To be sure, this happens only if there is any sense at
all in continuing with commercial activity, for if such is
not the case, then the remaining property is sold to satisfy
creditors. However, it is by no means advisable to maintain
the status quo ante in the form of long-term agony, or
support the gradual and unavoidable erosion of the
remaining assets.
However, the majority of countries in transition are
opting for exactly this alternative, as bankruptcy and
liquidation are still concepts with an extremely negative
connotation. The public accepts them with reluctance, and
workers tend to react to them with particular agitation.
Decision-makers know that prolonged agony along with
occasional repair work under the conditions of an already
introduced budgetary stringency (pliant budgeting can
prolong the life of an unsuccessful company, but at the
expense of the survival of the entire economy) is the worst
possible solution, but they do not dare provoke the odium
of the public and assume responsibility for a very
unpopular measure. Thus they allow the situation to
worsen to such a degree that those who were previously
ready to rebel against rational therapy then accept any
sort of solution. However, the basic flaw in this is that by
that time there is nothing left to salvage.
The above example of bankruptcy describes a
typically populist conduct with extremely harmful
consequences and a catastrophic outcome. However, from
the standpoint of a decision-maker this is still rational,
for maybe - in assuming the role of executioner - he would
threaten his own political existence. Such examples can
be listed by the dozen. At one point, the general public
and the political elite in Croatia went livid with rage over
a bid for a majority interest in a local textile giant to be
paid with frozen foreign currency deposits, which at the
time, as a public-debt bond and payment instrument, was
valued at more than half the par value of the company's
shares. This meant that any decision-maker who accepted
such an offer would have signed his own death sentence.
However, less than two years later the value of this
company's shares dropped to only seven per cent of their
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par value, so that the one-time bid seems
incomprehensibly generous from today's perspective. This
shows very explicitly the dual function of time: its
destructive as well as its cognitive/educational (perhaps
even pedagogic) effect.
What makes possible such an absurd, Catch 22-like
situation? The basic difficulty arises from undefined
ownership issues and the concept of the public domain.
Namely, the position of the decision-maker is very weak.
He does not represent himself or the employer with a clear-
cut interest, rather he represents the metaphysical "public
domain", whose interpreter is the divergent political elite
subject to the momentary pressures of the public mood.
On the other hand, his position is very comfortable, as his
existence does not depend on results, but rather on the
tactics of avoiding the critical mass of political peril. He
primarily runs a slalom between the crags, each of which
represents a painful and, in the short run, very unpopular
but therapeutically rational decision.
How can such a situation be overcome? Solely with
the strong political support of the highest authority, which
will oblige the executive to pass technically rational
decision. The negative effects of short-term unpopularity
should be warded off through a public-awareness
campaign and the constant interpretation of the
significance of the goal. If the public perceives that the
goal makes sense and that it is being realized at the same
time, support will take the place of wrath, and painful cuts
will be interpreted as necessary and temporary sacrifices.
However, an added hardship lies in the fact that the
highest political authority feels that it depends in large
part on the public mood. It does not want to place its own
position in jeopardy, particularly if it has not yet grasped
the full significance of the goal itself. Only the fundamental
understanding of the significance of the goal by the highest
authority may contribute to the discarding of populist in
favor of technical arguments.
Officials who are involved in privatization rarely
express their feelings on such dilemmas, although they
are present in all countries in transition. In the annual
report on privatization for 1994, Manfred Balz, today one
of the partners in the Berlin branch of the well-known law
firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, spoke very clearly on
this. He mentions the problem ofthe relationship between
populism and the technical optimum in a chapter entitled
"Political Control of the Privatization Process": "The day-
to-day operations, and especially the large organizational
measures and transactions of the THA, have been
supervised by a special department of the Federal Ministry
of Finance with a few dozen officials, as opposed to more
than 4,000 THA employees and hundreds of consultants.
The Parliament had previously set up a subcommittee of
the Budget Committee which later became a separate
THA committee where the finance minister and the THA
board reported at regular intervals. The Federal
Comptroller's Office (Bundesrechnungshof) commented
on specific aspects ofTHA practice, such as a bonus system
for managers which tied their income to the speed and
success indicators of privatization and, as already
mentioned, the efficiency of the management holding
companies. Obviously, the administrative and
parliamentary supervision of THA activities was very
loose. The privatization process could not possibly have
been conducted at its actual speed had it been exposed to
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the political and administrative controls which are
standard in parliamentary democracies. The very
construct of the THA with its monopoly on privatization,
with its cumulated ownership and decision-making
function, with its staff drawn from private enterprise and
-last but not least - with headquarters in Berlin, far from
the Bonn political decision makers, was designed to
exempt a largely technocratic process from the classical
methods of legitimizing important public decisions."!
I hold this statement by Manfred Balz as very
significant and I believe that it not only expounds the
problem dealt with in the present paper very well, but it
also provides an answer to many questions, although it
does not define the "process of passing public decisions"
as a technique of populism. The text contains several key
views which can serve as direct instructions to policy
makers in countries in transition:
1. Speed is an important factor for the successful
implementation of the privatization process.
2. The process of passing public decisions is slow and
inefficient.
3. Transition is not the normal and standard situation
in a democratic society and it requires management with
extra-constitutional authorization, which therefore should
not last too long, for this should lead to deformations of
the democratic system. Privatization as a key element of
transition needs some time of speedy enlightened
absolutism, after which a sort of zero hour of normality
comes into effect.
In the above quoted text from the German privatization
report there was no mention at all of populist-motivated
conduct, but the attempt to initiate it appeared in
parliamentary demands formulated at the end of 1993,
and which Balz also listed in several points at the end of
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the same section.' From this it is apparent that the German
political elite was no less sensitive to the domination of
operational!technicallogic in the passage of key decisions
on privatization than politicians in the post-Communist
countries. The powerful effort to put privatization under
direct political supervision, to "investigate criminal
activities in privatization and the Treuhand's response to
such activities", whose rhetoric and type of demands
reminds one of a similar attempt by the Croatian
parliament in 1994, consists of the desire to replace the
technical imperative with the imperative of the "public
good", which has much more populist motives. These
motives loyally maintain the beliefs, prejudices and fears
of the extensive electoral body, i.e., the so-called small
people in whose name the political elite raises the issue.
Germany had the good fortune to succeed in carrying
out the lion's share of privatization in the operational!
technical manner before the inert mechanism of political
will found its bearings. Also, the high professional quality
of the people active in implementing the process was a
guarantee of a successful result. Other countries have as
slim a chance of repeating this privatization blitzkrieg as
of earmarking DM 300 billion in their budgets for
privatization.
It is precisely for this reason that it is even more
important that the political elites and highest political
authorities of countries in transition give conscious support
to the technically-led process and not to kindle populist
fears. This certainly does not mean that the executive level
should be freed of all responsibility. Their responsibilities
should be made as rigorous as possible, but connected
exclusively to success in attaining clearly defined and
scheduled goals. Only in this case will it be possible to
carry out privatization with a minimum of social expense.
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